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SUPREME COURT RAMIFICATIONS
RELIABILITY OF CODEFENDANT
CONFESSIONS AND THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE:
LEE V. ILLINOIS
The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment' guarantees a
defendant in a criminal trial the right to confront and cross-ex-
amine any witness against him. This right of confrontation helps
' U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides in relevant part: "In all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .. .to be confronted with the witnesses
against him. ... Id.
The right to confront one's accusatory witnesses dates back to the time of Christ. See Acts
of the Apostles 25:15-16. When discussing St. Paul's trial before King Agrippa, St. Luke
wrote:
[T]he chief priests and elders of the Jews presented their case against him, and asked
for his conviction. But I told them that Romans are not accustomed to give any man
up before the accused has met his accusers face to face and has been given a chance
to defend himself against the charges.
Id.
I See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1898). In Kirby, the Court held that the right
of confrontation was "lo]ne of the fundamental guarantees of life and liberty," and "a
right long deemed so essential for due protection of life and liberty that it is guarded
against legislative and judicial action by provisions in the Constitution . I..." Id. at 55-56.
Since the Kirby decision, the Supreme Court has zealously protected the right of confronta-
tion in criminal trials as an essential safeguard to a fair trial. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308, 316 (1974) (confrontation clause allows cross-examiner to delve into the witness' char-
acter); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1966) (right of confrontation, if not waived,
violated when defendant is denied opportunity to cross-examine any witness against him);
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (primary right secured by confrontation
clause is that of cross-examination); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965) (confronta-
tion is a fundamental requirement of a fair trial); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97(1959) (right of confrontation has "ancient roots"); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687,
692 (1931) (confrontation is a "substantial right" to a fair trial); 5 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE
ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1395, at 123
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ensure the reliability of testimony implicating a criminal defend-
ant by requiring the declarant of such testimony to submit to
cross-examination under oath before the trier of fact.' Though
generally recognized in 'Anglo-American jurisprudence as essen-
tial to a fair trial, the right of confrontation had tenuous begin-
(3d ed. 1940). Dean Wigmore in discussing confrontation and cross-examination stated:
The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the oppor-
tunity of cross-examination. The opponent demands confrontation, not for the idle
purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the
purpose of cross-examination, which cannot be had except by the direct and per-
sonal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE: COM-
MENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES
1 800101], at 800-11 to -12 (1986) (discussion of the merits of cross-examination).
The right of confrontation under the sixth amendment has been held applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06. In its
discussion of confrontation, the Pointer Court noted that "[t]he fact that this right appears
in the Sixth Amendment of our Bill of Rights reflects the belief of the Framers of those
liberties and safeguards that confrontation was a fundamental right essential to a fair trial
in a criminal prosecution." Id. at 404. The Pointer decision overruled a long-standing doc-
trine which called for individual states to apply their own constitutional requirements for
confrontation. See West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 262 (1904) (sixth amendment right of
confrontation does not apply to states).
Prior to the decision in Pointer, in most instances, a state's interpretation of its own con-
frontation requirements led to results similar to those obtained under the sixth amend-
ment. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra, § 1397, at 127 n.1 (a list of states and their constitutional
provisions relating to confrontation).
8 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). The Court in discussing the
purpose of the confrontation clause noted:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was . . . [to allow]
cross-examination of the witness . .. [during) which the accused has an opportunity,
not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of
compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at
him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives
his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
Id. See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (cross-examination tests veracity of
witness' testimony); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1965) (tests sincerity and
recollection); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55-56 (1898) (gives defendant the ability
to impeach his accusor's testimony); Stewart, Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of
Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 22 (tests per-
ception, memory and communication of a witness).
Confrontation and cross-examination of an adverse witness are recognized as two of the
chief weapons an advocate has to obtain the truth. 5 J.WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1368, at
33-49. As suggested by Dean Wigmore, cross-examination is "the greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth." Id. § 1367, at 29. Cross-examination ensures
accuracy and completeness, and will very often expose fraud or honest error on the part of
the witness. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 31, at 68 (3d ed. 1984). See also
Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177,
186 (1948) (possibility of exposing falsehood is a strong motivator for sincerity).
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Confrontation Clause
nings,4 and even today is not absolute.5 At times this right must
"bow to accomodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial
process."6 One such legitimate interest is that of the prosecutor to
establish evidence admissible under the hearsay evidence rule.'
Somewhat analogous to the confrontation clause, 8 the hearsay
See Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses
Another One, 8 CraM. L. BULL. 99, 99-101 (1972). During the treason trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh, the accused demanded the right to confront the witnesses against him. Id. at 100.
This demand was rejected and Sir Walter Raleigh was subsequently executed for treason.
Id. at 100-0 1. Cf W. BEST, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIDENCE AND THE PRACTICE AS
TO PROOFS IN COURTS OF COMMON LAW § 102, at 120-21 (1849) (beginning of the hearsay
doctrine may extend as far back as the time of King Edward 11). Dean Wigmore main-
tained "[t]here never was at common law any recognized right to an indispensable thing
called Confrontation as distinguished from Cross-examination. There was a right to cross-ex-
amination as indispensable, and that right was involved in and secured by confrontation; it
was the same right under different names." 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1397, at 128-29
(emphasis in original). See generally California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174-80 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (history of the confrontation clause makes it difficult to determine
the actual intent of the Framers); Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and
Due Process - A Proposal for Determining When Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6
CONN. L. REV. 529, 532-34 (1974) (discussion of the historical background surrounding
right of confrontation).
' See, e.g., Cruz v. New York, 107 S. Ct. 1714, 1721 (1987) (harmless error overcomes
violation of the confrontation clause); Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2066 (1986) (admis-
sion which is judged a harmless error when assessed in view of the entire case does not
violate the confrontation clause); United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1127-28 (1986)
(lack of cross-examination not necessarily fatal to the admissibility of evidence under the
confrontation clause). See also infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussion of the
harmless error rule).
* Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973). The fact that the confrontation
clause does not always guarantee a criminal defendant the right to confront the witnesses
against him has been recognized by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (the right of confrontation "must occasionally give way to consid-
erations of public policy and the necessities of the case").
' See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 489, at 1149 (Federal Rules of
Evidence "attempt to strike a balance between the recognized needs of the accused and the
problems of the prosecution"); cf. Natali, Green, Dutton and Chambers: Three Cases in
Search of a Theory, 7 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 43, 73 (1975) ("no rule will perfectly resolve all possible
problems"). Despite the commentaries to the contrary, the Supreme Court has expressed
the opinion that the decisions reached over the years have not done injustice to either the
confrontation clause nor to the hearsay exceptions which have developed. Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 66 n.9 (1980).
* See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) ("Confrontation Clause and the eviden-
tiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots" but are not equivalent). See also California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970) (hearsay rules and confrontation clause are designed
to protect similar interests, but the Court has "more than once found a violation of con-
frontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably
recognized hearsay exception"); Payne v. Janasz, 711 F.2d 1305, 1314 (6th Cir.) (evidence
may be hearsay without violating the right of confrontation), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1019
(1983); See also Comment, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J 1434, 1437
(1966) ("no hearsay rule closely approximates the advantages of confrontation").
123
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 2: 121, 1987
evidence rule seeks to keep out of evidence statements made out
of court by persons not subject to cross-examination.9 At times
however, exceptions to the hearsay rule 0 will conflict with the
' See FED, R. EviD. 801(c). " 'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declar-
ant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." Id. Over the years, hearsay and the hearsay evidence rule have been
defined in a number of ways. See, e.g., Clement v. Packer, 125 U.S. 309, 321 (1888) (hear-
say evidence is "inadmissible to establish any specific fact which in its nature is capable of
being proved by the testimony of a person who speaks from his own knowledge"): 5 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1362, at 3 (the hearsay rule is "a rule rejecting assertions, offered
testimonially, which have not been in some way subjected to the test of Cross-examination") (empha-
sis in original). See also E. CLEARY, supra note 3, § 244, at 724-26 (brief discussion regard-
ing the history of the hearsay evidence rule).
Weinstein maintains that three conditions have developed which minimize the chance of
unreliable evidence: oath, personal presence at trial and cross-examination. 4 J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, supra note 2, 1 8001011, at 800-10 to -12. There are also four primary rea-
sons why hearsay evidence is considered unreliable: ambiguity, lack of candor or insincer-
ity, failure of memory, and misperception. 4 D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 7, §
413, at 69-70. See generally Morgan, supra note 3 (thorough analysis of reasons for exclud-
ing hearsay).
10 See FED. R. EvIo. 803 & 804. The Federal Rules of Evidence enumerate almost thirty
exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, however the number of "actual working" excep-
tions is no more than twelve. E. CLEARY, supra note 3, § 253, at 753. Dean Wigmore devel-
oped a list of fourteen exceptions which included: dying declarations, statements of facts
against interest, statements of a voter, and declarations of mental condition. 5 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 2, § 1420, at 202-03. According to Dean Wigmore, such evidence has a "cir-
cumstantial probability of trustworthiness", hence the reason for its admissibility and the
departure from the traditional hearsay rule. Id. § 1422, at 204-05. The state of flux under-
lying the hearsay evidence rule has caused some commentators to refer to the rule and its
varied list of exceptions as "resembliing] an old-fashioned crazy quilt made of patches cut
from a group of paintings by cubists, futurists and surrealists." Morgan & Maguire, Looking
Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARv. L. REv. 909, 921 (1937).
Over time, courts have ruled that admission of evidence which falls into certain recog-
nized hearsay exceptions is admissible without violating rights guaranteed by the confron-
tation clause. See, e.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972) (prior cross-examined
testimony): Delaney v. United States, 263 U.S. 586, 590 (1924) (statements of deceased
conspirator may be attested to by a co-conspirator as evidence against a third conspirator):
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895) (dying declarations). See also Lenza v.
Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804, 810 (8th Cir. 1981) (declarations of state of mind of declarant);
United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1979) (excited utterances); United
States v. Lee, 589 F.2d 980, 986-89 (9th Cir.) (affidavit made after diligent search stating
that record of requested information did not exist), ceri. denied, 444 U.S. 969 (1979);
United States v. Medico, 557 F.2d 309, 314 n.4 (2d Cir.) (hearsay exceptions listed in Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence satisfy rights guaranteed under the confrontation clause), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1356 (8th Cir. 1976)
(application of virtually all hearsay exceptions will not violate defendant's sixth amendment
rights), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977): United States v. Lipscomb, 435 F.2d 795, 802
(5th Cir. 1970) (entries in regular course of business), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 980 (1971);
Reed v. Beto, 343 F.2d 723, 724-25 (5th Cir. 1965) (public records of previous convic-
tions), affd, 385 U.S. 554 (1967): Comment, Hearsay, the Confrontation Guarantee and Re-
lated Problems, 30 LA. L. REv. 651, 668 (1970) (business and public records).
Confrontation Clause
confrontation clause in that they seek to admit evidence which a
literal interpretation of the confrontation clause would otherwise
bar."1 This is exemplified when the inculpatory confession of a
non-testifying codefendant is sought to be admitted as evidence of
a defendant's guilt.1 2 The Supreme Court has held this type of
confession to be presumptively unreliable unless the prosecutor
can show that the declarant of the inculpatory confession is un-
available and the statement contains adequate indicia of reliabil-
ity."0 However, in Lee v. Illinois,4 the Supreme Court failed to
properly apply the reliability portion of this test and concluded
that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment was violated
when an uncross-examined confession was relied upon by a state
trial court judge as substantive evidence against the declarant's co-
defendant.16 The Court rejected the State's argument that the co-
defendant's statement constituted a declaration against penal in-
terest" and thus was sufficiently reliable to be admitted without
" See Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2782 (1987) (literal interpretation of
the confrontation clause rejected as "unintended and too extreme") (quoting Ohio v. Rob-
erts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161-64 (1970) (discussion
of previous cases in which the question of the hearsay evidence and the confrontation
clause arose): Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REV.
207, 207 (1984) ("an intractable problem in criminal trials"). The interplay between the
expansive list of hearsay exceptions and the confrontation clause has not been constrained
by a strict rule of law, and is continually changing. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-65
(1980): California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970). See also Read, The New Confrontation-
Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 47 (1972). Commentators have recognized the com-
peting interests between the confrontation clause and evidence falling within a recognized
hearsay exception, and have offered numerous theories to reconcile the inherent differ-
ences between the two. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 4, at 556 (a showing of unavailability
and reliability before evidence is admissible): Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay
Rule, and the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEx. L. REV. 151, 205 (1978) (production of declarants
only if hearsay was accusatory): Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40
GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 76, 91-92 (1971) (all hearsay should be excluded except that which has
a high degree of trustworthiness, and a "total absence" of motive to falsify): cf. Westen, The
Future of Confrontation, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1185, 1187-88 (1979) (no tenable middle ground
has been found).
" See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987); Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct.
2056 (1986); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980): Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968); Comment, The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule: A Problematic Relationship
in Need of a Practical Analysis, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 949 (1987).
13 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1979). See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text
(application of the Roberts test).
" 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986).
I id. at 2065-66.
ie See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (analysis of declarations against penal
interest).
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cross-examination.a
In Lee, the petitioner, Millie Lee, confessed to her and her boy-
friend Thomas' involvement in the killing of her aunt and her
aunt's friend, Ms. Harris.18 Lee contended that she acted in self-
defense in killing her aunt, but implicated Thomas in the murder
of Ms. Harris. 19 Thomas, after a confrontation with Lee and upon
being informed that inculpatory statements were made by Lee in
the presence of the police, made his own confession. 0 Both con-
fessions were similar in many respects, although Thomas' confes-
sion asserted the two murders were premeditated by both him and
Lee."
17 Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2064 n.5. The Court stated: "We reject respondent's categorization
of the hearsay involved in this case as a simple 'declaration against penal interest.' That
concept defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis." Id.
" Id. According to Lee, she was present with Thomas in the apartment which she
shared with her aunt. Id. at 2058. Her aunt arrived at the apartment accompanied by
Odessa Harris, and soon thereafter Harris and Lee had "two or three words not really an
argument" in the kitchen. Id. When Odessa left the kitchen to return to the bedroom,
Odessa passed Thomas and gave him "dirty looks." Id. Odessa turned her back on
Thomas, at which point Thomas stabbed her in the back with a twenty-four inch long
knife. Id. After Odessa was stabbed, Thomas entered the kitchen "with the knife in his
hand with blood on it." Id. at 2059. Lee then went into the bedroom where her aunt was,
and upon entering the bedroom, her aunt rose up from the bed with a knife in her hand
and threatened her. Id. Lee then recounted that she returned to the kitchen, obtained a
butcher's knife, returned to the bedroom and repeatedly stabbed her aunt to death. Id.
" Id. at 2058-59. Lee also presented an argument in the alternative, which maintained
she acted as "the result of a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provoca-
tion." Id. at 2060. The trial court judge rejected this argument and noted that no evidence
had been presented tu show that the murder of Lee's aunt resulted from a sudden and
intense passion. Id. at 2061.
" Id. at 2058. When Lee and Thomas met together in the police station, Lee pleaded
with Thomas to share "the rap" with her. Id. In response to his girlfriend's pleading,
Thomas made his own confession. Id. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
" Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2059. The confession of Thomas was similar to the statement given
by Lee in that both confessions described the argument which had occurred between the
two codefendants, the confrontation with Odessa in the kitchen, and the commission of
both murders. Id. The confessions diverged regarding the question of premeditation. Id.
The pertinent portions of Thomas' confession were quoted by the Court as follows:
This is when I asked [Lee] 'did she still want to go through with it?' . . . . We had
talked about doing something to Aunt Beedie, but we had not figure out just what
we would do. We had never before discussed doing anything to Odessa just Aunt
Beedie, because we were tired of Aunt Beedie getting drunk, and coming home and
'going off' on [Lee] .... After asking [Lee], 'did she still want to do it?' [Lee] first
gave me a funny look, as though she was not going to do it, she stared into space for
awhile, then she looked at me and said, 'yes'.
We decided that if we did somlelthing to Aunt Beedie, we had to do something
with Odessa .... We had plained [sic] that [Lee] was supposed to get Odessa to
stand, with her back toward the front room, looking into the kitchen, while I would
Confrontation Clause
In a joint bench trial during which neither defendant testified,2 2
the trial court found the petitioner Millie Lee guilty of both
murders. The court relied upon Thomas' confession as substan-
tive evidence in reaching its decision." The Appellate Court of
Illinois, Fifth District, affirmed the conviction without opinion,2 4
and the Illinois Supreme Court subsequently denied leave to
appeal.'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari," and in a
five to four decision, reversed judgment and remanded the case.2 7
The majority" found insufficient "indicia of reliability" to over-
come the presumption of unreliability usually associated with such
uncross-examined evidence." Similarly, the majority noted that
Thomas' confession was not deemed reliable simply because it "in-
terlocked"' 0 with certain aspects of the petitioner's account of the
murders. 1 Moreover, the majority refused to consider Thomas'
grab her from the back, using the big knife ....
d. at 2059.
U Id. at 2060. Before the trial, both defendant's withdrew their motion for separate
trials. Id. The defendants only testified with regard to their respective motions to suppress
their individual confessions, which were denied by the trial court judge. Id.
" Id. at 2061. Lee was sentenced to a term of 40 years of imprisonment for the murder
of Ms. Harris, and life imprisonment for the murder of her aunt. Id. The trial court judge
explained that he rejected the assertions contained in Lee's confession and relied on the
confession of Thomas and his version of the facts. Id.
u People v. Lee, 129 I1. App. 3d 1167, 491 N.E.2d 1391 (11. App. Ct. 1984).
" Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. at 2061.
N Lee v. Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 3524 (1985).
U Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. at 2065-66. The matter was remanded to the Illinois Appel-
late Court for a determination concerning whether the admission of the uncross-examined
confession of the codefendant resulted in a "harmless error." Id. See infra notes 79-81 and
accompanying text (discussion of harmless error rule).
" Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2056. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices
White, Marshall, Stevens and O'Connor joined. Id.
" d. at 2065.
"Id. at 2064-65. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (discussion of "interlock-
ing confessions").
8, Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2064. The Lee Court based its findings of insufficient indicia of
reliability on several factors. Id. at 2064-65. First, the codefendant's inculpatory confession
was elicited only after he was confronted with Lee's statement implicating him in both
murders. Id. at 2064. Second, the record indicated a possibility that Thomas' confession
may have been a distortion of the facts, and an act of retaliation against Lee. Id. The
majority noted that the codefendant considered the possibility of becoming Lee's adver-
sary. Id. The most important factors focused upon by the majority were the few discrepan-
cies between the two confessions concerning the petitioner's involvement, facilitation, and
certain factual circumstances relevant to premeditation. Id. at 2065. The Court concluded
that these differences were not "irrelevant or trivial," and therefore maintained it should
127
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statement to be reliable despite it being a declaration against his
penal interest.3a
Justice Blackmun writing for the dissent"3 argued that the code-
fendant's inculpatory confession was sufficiently reliable to war-
rant its admission as substantive evidence of the petitioner's
guilt." The dissent noted that not only was Thomas' statement
thoroughly adverse to his penal interest, but it was also exten-
sively corroborated by independent evidence.386 Furthermore, Jus-
tice Blackmun noted that Thomas' statements were also corrobo-
rated in certain relevant respects by Lee's confession.3
It is suggested that the Lee Court, in reaching its decision, incor-
rectly focused on the theoretical underpinnings of the confronta-
tion clause and ignored the practical effect of its application to the
facts present in Lee. It is further submitted that the codefendant's
statement in Lee constituted a declaration against interest and as
such was sufficiently reliable so as not to have violated the defend-
ant's right of confrontation.
I. RELIABILITY AND CODEFENDANT CONFESSIONS
Historically, the reliability of a codefendant's inculpatory con-
fession was ensured by requiring the declarant to undergo cross-
examination. 1 Over the years, however, courts have gradually
not deviate from the well-founded rule that a codefendant's confession inculpating the ac-
cused is inherently unreliable, and that convictions supported by such evidence violate the
constitutional right of confrontation. Id. Accord Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126
(1968).
" Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2064 n.5. See infra notes 54-56 (discussion of declarations against
penal interest).
Lee, 106 S. Ct. 2066. Justice Blackmun wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Id.
Id. at 2068 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun maintained that statements
against interest, as a recognized hearsay exception, must be judged in terms of reliability.
Id. See also infra notes 54-56 (discussion of declarations against penal interest).
Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2069 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 2069-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Both confessions agree not only as to the
manner in which the murders were committed, but also as to the defendant's activities
subsequent to the death of the two women. Id. at 2070 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
'7 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (historical background surrounding cross-
examination). Cf Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in
Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1378, 1390 (1972) ("Absent
sufficient inherent assurances of reliability, the only permissible guarantor of the hearsay
declaration's evidentiary value is the defendant's cross-examination of the declarant.").
Some forms of evidence have been deemed reliable even though the declarant was not
Confrontation Clause
shifted from a guarantee of cross-examination to a guarantee
against the admission of unreliable hearsay."" As a result of this
gradual shift, courts have attempted to redefine the parameters of
reliability regarding inculpatory codefendant confessions.3 ' The
test currently employed is the "indicia of reliability" test formu-
lated in Ohio v. Roberts.'
The Court in Roberts held that a codefendant's confession impli-
cating his accomplice was presumptively unreliable, but held that
this presumption could be rebutted." In order to rebut this pre-
cross-examined. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970) (preliminary hear-
ing testimony of an unavailable witness); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) (dying
declarations and prior testimony); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895)
(dying declarations); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1878) (former testi-
mony admissible where witness is kept away from trial by the adverse party). Cf supra note
10 and accompanying text (discussion of exceptions to the hearsay rule).
" See generally 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. B.RGER, supra note 2, 800[04], at 800-19 to -35
(discussion of the various interpretations given to the confrontation clause).
During the 1960's, the Supreme Court regarded a defendant's right of confrontation as
a guarantee against the admission of uncross-examined testimony. See Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (defendant's right of confrontation denied when codefendant
who was a declarant of an inculpatory statement refused to testify): Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719 (1968) (defendant's right of confrontation violated when state failed to make a
good faith effort to produce witness); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (prosecu-
tor's reading to the jury of the confession of previously convicted co-felon violated defend-
ant's right of confrontation).
In the 1970's, however, the Court relaxed its strict interpretation of the confrontation
clause requiring that a declarant be produced at trial, and began to allow the admission of
all evidence determined to be reliable. See Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979) (inter-
locking confessions admissible); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (co-conspirator state-
ments admissible against defendant): California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (declarant's
statement given at preliminary hearing admissible when declarant is available and testifying
at trial).
3 See generally Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (indicia of reliability test); Parker v.
Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979) (interlocking confessions test); Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay,
87 HARv. L. REv. 957, 958-61 (1974) (proposal for a method of determining the reliability
of hearsay by minimizing the four "testimonial infirmities," namely ambiguity, insincerity,
erroneous memory and faulty perception). Some commentators, though, have expressed
the opinion that courts have been unsuccessful in their attempts to strike a balance be-
tween the rights granted under the confrontation clause and the exceptions to the hearsay
rule. See, e.g., Read, supra note 11, at 48.
40 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
41 Id. at 73. During a preliminary hearing in Roberts, a witness made adverse statements
against the petitioner's interest. Id. at 58. When this witness failed to appear at trial, de-
spite the issuance of several subpoenas, a transcript of her testimony was introduced into
evidence. Id. at 59. The defendant was convicted and thereafter appealed claiming the
admission of the witness' statement violated his rights under the sixth amendment. Id. The
court of appeals reversed, holding that the prosecution failed to make a good faith effort to
secure the testimony of the witness. Id. at 60. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the
decision on other grounds holding that the mere opportunity to cross-examine during a
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sumption, the Court in Roberts noted that the prosecution must
first show that the declarant is "unavailable, ' 42 and then prove
that the confession bears "adequate 'indicia of reliability'. 4 The
"indicia of reliability" are shown if the confession falls within a
"firmly rooted hearsay exception"" or contains "particularized
preliminary hearing did not satisfy the defendant's right of confrontation. Id. at 60-62.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari at 441 U.S. 904 (1979).
4' Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. The prosecution is held to a "good faith" standard to show
that a witness is unavailable. Id. at 74 (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25
(1968)). See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 189 n.22 (1970) (prosecution must make a
reasonable attempt to produce a witness); Dres v. Campoy, 784 F.2d 996, 998-1001 (9th
Cir. 1986) (same). This standard is not very demanding, and at times does not have to be
met where it would be inconvenient for the prosecution to produce the declarant, or where
cross-examination by the accused would be of little benefit in showing that the statement
was unreliable. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 n.7. See also United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121,
1126 (1986) (no showing of unavailability required for admission of statements from a non-
testifying co-conspirator). Cf. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 1401-1418, at 146-201 (vari-
ous types of unavailability are described, and their ramifications on the hearsay rule dis-
cussed). See generally Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitu-
tional Unavailability Requirement, 70 MINN. L. REV. 665 (1986) (in-depth discussion of
unavailability); Note, Confrontation and the Unavailable Witness: Searching for a Standard, 18
VAL U.L. REV. 193, 197-208 (1983) (historical development of unavailability).
The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize the following as acceptable reasons for a de-
clarant's unavailability as a witness: (1) declaration of a valid privilege, (2) persistent refusal
to testify, (3) lack of memory, (4) death or physical or mental impairment, and (5) absence
from the hearing despite reasonable effort to procure declarant's attendance. FED. R. EviD.
804(a). Justice Brennan maintained that while physical unavailability would not cast doubt
on the reliability of a declarant's earlier testimony, fear of self-incrimination at trial, or
feigned or actual memory loss might tend to do so. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 202
(1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan has suggested that only in situations where the evidence in question con-
sists of official statements, learned treatises, trade reports, business or laboratory analysis
should it be permissible for the prosecution to make no attempt to produce the declarant.
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95-96 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Courts have held a defendant's right to confrontation was not violated when the declar-
ant of an inculpatory statement invoked his privilege against self-incrimination under the
fifth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. De Luna, 763 F.2d 897, 910 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 382 (1985); United States v. Rodriguez, 706 F.2d 31, 40 (2d Cir. 1983).
Cf United States v. Vandetti, 623 F.2d 1144, 1148 (6th Cir. 1980) (defendant's sixth
amendment rights violated when prosecutor called codefendant knowing he would not
testify).
" Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972)).
" Id. at 66. The Court noted that "certain [firmly rooted] hearsay exceptions rest upon
such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with
the 'substance of the constitutional protection.' " Id. (citation and footnote omitted). The
Court cited four previously recognized exceptions which it considered firmly rooted: dying
declarations, cross-examined prior-trial testimony, properly administered business records
and public records. Id. at 66 n.8.
One commentator has suggested that application of the Roberts decision would result in
the denial of a defendant's constitutional right of confrontation. See Seidelson, The Confron-
tation Clause, the Right Against Self-Incrimination and the Supreme Court: A Critique and Some
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guarantees of trustworthiness." ' Although the Supreme Court in
Modest Proposals, 20 DuQ. L. REV. 429, 433-36 (1982). Professor Seidelson asserted "the
sixth amendment right of confrontation should be interpreted to exclude extrajudicial ac-
cusatory declarations, even where such declarations 'fall within a firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ception' or possess 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' " Id. at 460-61 (emphasis
in original). Professor Seidelson maintained that such an interpretation would ensure that
the basic purpose behind the confrontation clause is preserved. Id. at 461.
It has not been determined whether an exception is "firmly rooted" simply because of its
age, or by its acceptance by a number of jurisdictions. See Lilly supra note 11, at 228.
Commentators have maintained that the constitutionality of a hearsay exception should
rest upon the likelihood of reliability rather than longevity. See, e.g., Comment, Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(bX3) and Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest, 66 CALIF. L. REV.
1189, 1214-17 (1978). See also State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 709-10, 370 N.W.2d 745,
759 (1985).
The failure of the Supreme Court to define the term "firmly rooted" hearsay exception
has resulted in numerous attempts by lower courts to develop a workable standard. See, e.g.,
United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 695 n.7 (7th Cir. 1985) (business records are
firmly rooted hearsay), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2919 (1986); Barker v. Morris, 761 F.2d
1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1985) (videotaped testimony not within a firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 814 (1986); Williams v. Melton, 733 F.2d 1492, 1495 (11 th
Cir.) (res gestae exception to hearsay rule not a violation of defendant's confrontation clause
rights), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984); United States v. Harenberg, 732 F.2d 1507,
1515 (10th Cir. 1984) (grand jury testimony not a firmly rooted hearsay exception); Olson
v. Green, 668 F.2d 421, 427-28 (8th Cir.) (custodial statements implicating a third party do
not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1009 (1982);
United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349 (5th Cir. 1981) (declaration against interest is
firmly rooted hearsay exception), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965 (1983); Brown v. Tard, 552 F.
Supp. 1341, 1351 (D.N.J. 1982) (contemporaneous statements are firmly rooted hearsay
exceptions). See also 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 800[04], at 800-35 (hear-
say exceptions listed in Federal Rules of Evidence are firmly rooted hearsay exceptions).
41 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. Some commentators have maintained that a statement con-
taining "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" is one which on a previous occasion
was subjected to some form of cross-examination by the accused. See Note, Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(dX2XE) and the Confrontation Clause: Closing the Window of Admissibility for
Coconspirator Hearsay, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291, 1308 (1985) (most Supreme Court cases
which have admitted hearsay involved previously cross-examined testimony of an unavaila-
ble witness); Comment, supra note 44, at 1197 (confrontation clause not violated if witness
was previously cross-examined and shown to be unavailable). But see California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 196-98 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (due to their less formal structure, a
defendant's right to confrontation is rarely satisfied at preliminary hearings); United States
v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84-85 (8th Cir. 1980) (statements made by patient to physician
admissible without having physician undergo cross-examination), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1001 (1981); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1137-38 (4th Cir. 1978) (prior re-
corded grand jury testimony admissible despite absence of cross-examination); Davenport,
supra note 37, at 1390 (absent cross-examination, only reliable statements should be
admissible).
Courts have been provided with few guidelines to determine when a sufficient form of
cross-examination has taken place. See, e.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 214-16 (1972)
(cross-examination of declarant at preliminary hearing is sufficient); Green, 399 U.S. at 168-
70 (prior cross-examined testimony admissible after declarant claimed memory loss);
United States v. Johnson, 735 F.2d 1200, 1203 (9th Cir. 1984) (adequate opportunity to
cross-examine during a deposition); Glenn v. Dallman, 635 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir. 1980)
(testimony given at preliminary hearing admissible even though petitioner did not take
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Roberts provided this test for determining when hearsay is admissi-
ble, the Court's failure to clarify the components of the test have
left lower courts to their own devices in determining the admissi-
bility of such evidence.4 The case of Lee v. Illinois is the most
recent example in which the deficiencies of the Roberts test are
illustrated.4
II. MISAPPLICATION OF THE ROBERTS TEST
A. Unavailability
Application of the Roberts test to the facts in Lee first required
that the Court find the declarant to be unavailable." The Court
in Lee, however, never reached this issue when it held that
Thomas' confession was unreliable and thus inadmissible." Not-
withstanding, an analysis of the facts reveals that although
Thomas was present in the courtroom throughout Lee's trial,50 he
was nevertheless unavailable for purposes of the Roberts test.8 1
The unavailability requirement has never been strictly enforced,
and all that is required of a prosecutor is good faith in obtaining
the witness' testimony. If Thomas had been called to testify, he
opportunity to fully cross-examine declarant), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 843 (1981); Buelow v.
Dickey, 622 F. Supp. 761, 765-66 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (statement given at investigative hear-
ing presided over by state circuit court judge which corroborated a statement given to
police earlier contained particularized guarantees of trustworthiness).
" See Lilly, supra note 11, at 228 (leaves room for case-by-case development). Among
some factors considered by the courts are adequate opportunity to observe, spontaneity of
speech, likelihood of sufficient recollection and motive to falsify. Id.
47 See Comment, supra note 12, at 951-67 (analysis of court's struggle with the Roberts
test). See also Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2782-83 (1987).
4" See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussion of unavailability). But see Westen,
supra note 11, at 1188-90 ("availability" necessitates ability to give incriminating evidence
in the form of live testimony in open court, under oath and subject to cross-examination).
4 Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2061. ("[w]e need not address the question of Thomas' availability").
" Id. at 2067 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Physical presence of a witness in a courtroom
does not make his testimony available. See E. C.EARY, supra note 3, § 253, at 754.
" Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2067 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It has been noted that unavailability
relates not to the availability of the witness but to the availability of his testimony.
E. CLEARY, supra note 3, § 253 at 754. See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 168
(1969).
U See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968); Kirkpatrick, supra note 42, at 670-
77. Some courts have maintained that actual invocation of the fifth amendment privilege is
a mere formality when determining the availability of a witness. See United States v.
Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1978). Although FED. R. EvID. 804(aX) requires the
court to rule upon the validity of the witness' claim of privilege, such a requirement need
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would have invoked his fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination."
B. Reliability
Although the first element of Roberts had been satisfied, the Lee
Court erred in holding Thomas' confession to be unreliable, de-
spite it being a declaration against the declarant's penal interest.
The declaration against penal interest exception" to the hearsay
evidence rule is founded upon the assumption that people will not
make damaging statements against themselves unless the state-
ments are in fact true. 5 Many courts and commentators, in con-
not be met where it is a mere formality. See, e.g., United States v. Young Bros., Inc., 728
F.2d 682, 690-91 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984). Moreover, courts and com-
mentators have argued that the unavailability requirement can be done away with. See, e.g.,
United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1128 (1986) (showing of unavailability in case
involving co-conspirator statements would be burdensome to the prosecutor): E. CLEARY,
supra note 3, § 253, at 753-58; Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the
Hearsay Rule, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1944) (unavailability requirement is inconsistent
when viewed in light of other exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as spontaneous utter-
ances and dying declarations).
88 Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2067 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist, in his concur-
rence in New Mexico v. Earnest, 106 S. Ct. 2734 (1986), maintained that failure to cross-
examine a declarant "is not necessarily fatal to the admissibility of evidence under the Con-
frontation Clause" in view of Ohio v. Roberts. Earnest, 106 S. Ct. at 2735 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
4 See FED. R. Evil. 804(bX3). A statement is against the declarant's interest if the state-
ment when made is "so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or
so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable man in his
position would not have made the statement unless [he believed] it to be true." Id. In order
for a statement to qualify as a declaration against penal interest, the declarant must have
made a statement which was against his interest, such that a reasonable person would not
have made the statement unless true, and the declarant must be unavailable at the time of
trial. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 1 804(b)(3)[021, at 804-128 to -138;
E. CLEARY, supra note 3, § 276, at 819.
Courts had traditionally drawn a distinction between penal and pecuniary or proprietary
interests. Ponsoldt & Steering, Accomplice Accusations in the Criminal Process: The Application
of Sixth Amendment Test for Reliability of Hearsay Evidence to Probable Cause Determinations, 16
RUTGERS L.J. 869, 883-84 (1985). This distinction was ultimately rejected by the courts
since a declarant's penal interest is as important, if not more so, than his pecuniary or
proprietary interest. See Jefferson, supra note 52, at 39. See generally E. CLEARY, supra note
3, § 278, at 822-24 (discussion of the development of the declaration against penal interest
exception).
" See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1457, at 262-63 ("The basis of the Exception is the
principle of experience that a statement asserting a fact distinctly against one's interest is
entirely unlikely to be deliberately false or heedlessly incorrect, and is thus sufficiently sanc-
tioned, though oath and cross-examination are wanting."); Morgan, The Rationale of Vicari-
ous Admissions, 42 HARv. L. REV. 461, 480-81 (1929) (sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness
found in declarations against penal interest); Comment, supra note 44, at 1209-10 (coin-
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sidering the admissibility of declarations against penal interest,
view such statements with much skepticism and consider them in-
herently unreliable."
Courts look with disfavor on declarations against penal interest
when such statements appear to shift the blame onto another,",
seem to curry favor from the police," or are tainted by police
coercion.5 9 On its face, the confession of Thomas does appear to
mon sense dictates people generally do not concede untrue facts against their interest).
Some commentators, however, have argued that such an assumption is based upon a mis-
perception of human nature. See, e.g., 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2,
1 804(b)(3)[01], at 804-123 ("Persons will lie despite the consequences to themselves to
exculpate those they love or fear, to inculpate those they hate or fear, or because they are
congenital liars."). Others have contended the real reason behind the reluctance to allow
the admission of declarations against penal interest is the "fear of opening a door to a
flood of witnesses testifying falsely to confessions that were never made or testifying truth-
fully to confessions that were false." See, e.g., E. CLEARY, supra note 3, § 278, at 823.
" See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 1980) (statement which
implicates accomplice even though against declarant's penal interest is unreliable and must
be subjected to cross-examination); United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir.
1978) (the admissibility of inculpatory declarations against penal interest requires proof of
trustworthiness); United States v. H & M, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 651, 668 (M.D. Pa. 1983)
(statement against interest not "firmly rooted," therefore "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness" test must be used); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2,
T 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-150 to -157 (declaration against penal interest if not shown to be
reliable will violate the Confrontation Clause). But see Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S.
243, 278 (1913) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("no other statement is so much against interest as
a confession of murder"); United States v. Harrell, 788 F.2d 1524, 1526 (1 th Cir. 1986)
(declarant's tape recorded conversation implicating codefendant deemed admissible as
statement against interest); United States v. Winley, 638 F.2d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 1981) (plea
of guilty surrounded with "safeguards of trustworthiness"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 959
(1982); United States v. Love, 592 F.2d 1022, 1025-26 (8th Cir. 1979) (confessions against
interest are reliable even where third party is implicated). Declarations against interest
have been found to be reliable and therefore admissible as evidence if: the declarant is
unavailable, the statement is against the declarant's penal interest, and there are cor-
roborating circumstances indicating the trustworthiness of the statement. United States v.
Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 699-701 (5th Cir. 1978).
5' See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968) (there is a "recognized motiva-
tion to shift blame onto others"); 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 7, § 489, at 1176
("disserving interest is outweighed by the apparent overall self-serving purpose").
" See FED. R. EvID. 804 advisory committee note ("a statement admitting guilt and impli-
cating another person, made while in custody, may well be motivated by a desire to curry
favor with the authorities and hence fail to qualify as [a declaration] against [penal] inter-
est"). See also United States v. Johnson, 802 F.2d 1459, 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (common
knowledge that accomplice can curry favor with police by implicating others in the of-
fense); Note, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and the Confrontation Clause, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 159, 163-64 (1983) (confession coerced by the police should be viewed as
unreliable).
" See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 98 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Another reason,
equally valid, though rarely alleged and proven is intimidation of the declarant by the de-
fendant or his cohorts. See, e.g., United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir.
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shift the blame onto his codefendant.' 0 The majority correctly
noted that Thomas could have confessed in order to shift the
blame onto the petitioner for initially implicating him in the mur-
der of Ms. Harris."1 But irrespective of his motive, Thomas' con-
fession failed to accomplish that end." Thomas freely admitted to
stabbing Odessa Harris, and attributed to the petitioner only ac-
tions which she had already admitted to in her own confession."3
Thomas, through his confession, at no time attempted to, nor suc-
ceeded in, minimizing his own guilt at the expense of the peti-
tioner.' Therefore, the majority's assertion that Thomas' confes-
sion could have been motivated by a desire to shift the blame onto
Lee, rendering it unreliable, was without merit." In addition,
Thomas' confession did not appear to stem from any attempt to
curry the favor of police as his statement was thoroughly adverse
to his penal interest." There was no evidence that Thomas' con-
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
'0 See Lee, 106 S. Ct. 2068-69 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 2064-65. Among the possible reasons behind Thomas' confession could have
been the desire to shift the blame onto Lee or to curry the favor of the police. Id. See supra
notes 56-58. Some courts have ruled that absent these reasons, a declarant's incriminating
statement which also inculpates a codefendant is admissible. See, e.g., United States v. Gar-
ris, 616 F.2d 626, 632 (2d Cir.) (declarant's statement admissible where there were no
threats, suggested promises, or fostered hopes of leniency), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 926
(1980).
40 Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2068-69 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Reliability was present in
Thomas' confession by virtue of the fact that his confession did not diminish his own guilt.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
' See supra notes 18 and 21 (the confessions of Lee and Thomas).
Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2069 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Thomas' confession was contrary to
the usual way in which a declarant would attempt to shift the blame onto his codefendant.
See United States v. Monaco, 735 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1984) (declarant minimized his
responsibility more than he incriminated himself); United States v. Coachman, 727 F.2d
1293, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (codefendant's "attempt to trivialize his own involvement in
the nefarious scheme by shifting responsibility to his cohorts"); United States v. Lilley, 581
F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1978) (statements were made to "shift suspicion away from ...
[codefendant] and to soften the impact of his admission").
The majority contended that Thomas was considering becoming a witness for the prose-
cution prior to trial in support of its argument that Thomas' confession was given to shift
the blame to the petitioner. Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2064. Although this may be true, it is irrele-
vant, since the motivation underlying a confession is determined at the time given not a
time subsequent to the original confession. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)
(spontaneous statement against declarant's penal interest contained indicia of reliability).
" Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2069 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See infra notes 79-81 (discussion of
harmless error rule).
" Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2069 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra note 58 (discussion of
confessions motivated by desire to curry favor).
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fession was conditioned upon a deal with the authorities.67 Finally,
Thomas' confession was neither coerced nor obtained through po-
lice impropriety. 8 The majority in Lee never raised the issue of
police coercion and spoke only in broad generalities regarding the
problems associated with a statement obtained through such
means.
69
The reliability of Thomas' inculpatory confession was further
strengthened by the fact that it was extensively corroborated by
the petitioner's own statement and physical evidence associated
with the commission of the crime.7 0 Thomas' confession "inter-
Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2069 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Although the majority noted there
may have been a motive to curry favor from the police, no evidence was offered to support
such a contention. Id. at 2064. Compare United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092,
1102 (5th Cir. 1981)(declarant allowed to plead guilty to only one of the five counts on
which he was initially indicted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 834 (1982) and United States v. Love,
592 F.2d 1022, 1026 (8th Cir. 1979) (appeared to declarant that "her best chance of being
released promptly was to make a statement implicating someone else") with Lee, 106 S. Ct.
at 2069 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (declarant's statement did not minimize his own guilt),
" Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2071 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (testimony was presented which
showed that declarant was not coerced or threatened by the police).
Justice Harlan has contended as a matter of due process, the confession of any accom-
plice made during police interrogations should not be admitted against a codefendant. Dut-
ton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 98 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Davenport, supra
note 37, at 1395-96 (police questioning could amount to duress); cf. Comment, supra note
44, at 1210 (police custody fosters self-serving statements).
6 Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2062. Absent any evidence tending to show unconstitiutional police
conduct, the reliability of Thomas' confession should not be held inadmissible simply be-
cause it was gained during police questioning. Id. at 2070-71 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(declarant notified of his fifth amendment rights). But see United States v. Robinson, 635
F.2d 363 (5th Cir.) (declarant's statement, given after Miranda warning, and after police
made no promise of leniency nor indicated that it would help to implicate others, found
admissible), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981). But cf. Fine, Declarations Against Penal Interest
in New York. Carte Blanche?, 21 SYRAcuSE L. REV. 1095, 1111-12 (1970) (confession in re-
sponse to receipt of repeated Miranda warnings deemed unreliable since declarant may be
attempting to curry favor).
70 United States ex rel. Cantanzaro v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 942 (1970). The Court in Mancusi first developed the "interlocking confession"
doctrine. Lung, Parker v. Randolph. The Right of Confrontation and the Interlocking Confession
Doctrine, 32 HAS NGS LJ. 305, 317-18 (1980).
The interlocking confession doctrine was further extended in Parker, where in a plurality
opinion, the Court held that admission of an interlocking confession did not violate the
defendant's right of confrontation provided that limiting instructions were presented to
the jury. 442 U.S. 62, 75 (1979). This view was subsequently rejected by the Court in Cruz
v. New York, 107 S. Ct. 1714 (1987), in which it was held that despite limiting instructions,
admission of an inculpatory confession of a nontestifying codefendant resulted in a viola-
tion of the confrontation clause. Id. at 1720. The Court noted, however, that this constitu-
tional violation might in some instances result in a harmless error. Id.
To this date there has been no consensus of opinion among the courts as to how closely
two statements must agree before they can be considered "interlocking." See, e.g., United
Confrontation Clause
locked ' 7 1 with the petitioner's statement in every salient respect."'
This extensive corroboration effectively made the motive behind
Thomas' inculpatory statement irrelevant regardless of the possi-
bility of it being given to shift blame onto the petitioner, to curry
the favor of the police, or whether it was tainted by police coer-
cion.7' Although the confessions diverged with respect to the
question of premeditation,74 it should be noted that premeditation
is not an element of the crime of murder in Illinois, 75 nor was the
States v. Paternina-Vergara, 749 F.2d 993, 999 (2d Cir. 1984) (confessions interlock de-
spite discrepancies as to whether defendant knew he was transporting narcotics), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985); Tamilio v. Fogg, 713 F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1983) (confessions
interlock if they are "substantially the same and consistent on the major elements of the
crime involved"), cert. dernied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1984); Montes v. Jenkins, 626 F.2d 584, 589
(7th Cir. 1980) (confessions must be in "substance identical" in order to interlock); United
States ex rel. Stanbridge v. Zelker, 514 F.2d 45, 49-50 (2d Cir.) (confessions interlock de-
spite discrepancies as to whether codefendant knew his accomplice was armed), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 872 (1975): United States ex rel. Ortiz v. Fritz, 476 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.) (confes-
sions interlock despite being dissimilar as to time crime was committed, but essentially simi-
lar regarding motive and plot), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973); United States ex rel.
Johnson v. Lane, 639 F. Supp. 260, 268 (N.D. 111. 1986) (confessions "substantially identi-
cal" as to time, manner, plot and execution of crime interlock, despite discrepancies as to
physical particulars of the crime); Note, The Second Circuit's Exceptions to Bruton v. United
States: The Need for a Reexamination, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 793, 804 (1978) (confessions in-
terlock when "the confession of the nontestifying codefendant can add nothing to what is
already in evidence").
" Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2069 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Both confessions detail the same
crimes, the same manner of attack, the same efforts to conceal the crimes, and the same
motives. Id. at 2069-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Most importantly, the individual confes-
sions of each defendant attributed to the other actions to which that party confessed. Id. at
2069 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 2070 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As noted by Justice Blackmun, the fact that
confessions interlock does not dictate that the confessions are automatically admissible. Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). However, the interlocking nature of the statements should not
be deemed irrelevant in determining whether the statements contain sufficient reliability to
be admitted without violating the confrontation clause. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See
Cruz v. New York, 107 S. Ct. 1714, 1720 (1987) (interlocking confessions pertain to
reliability).
" Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2069 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584
F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir. 1978) (corroboration has been held to be "necessary to a logical
interrelation" between a declaration against penal interest, and a defendant's right of
confrontation).
"' Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2065. The majority maintained that the question of premeditation
was an issue in dispute during the trial of Lee. Id. But see infra notes 75-76 and accompany-
ing text.
78 ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 9-1 to -3 (Smith-Hurd 1979 & Supp. 1986). The confession
of the petitioner, supra note 18, does not describe self-defense or the criie of voluntary
manslaughter as is defined by Illinois law. ILL ANN. STAT ch. 38 § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1979 &
Supp. 1986).
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petitioner charged with the crime of conspiracy."'
It is therefore submitted that sufficient evidence existed to re-
but the perceived unreliability surrounding Thomas' inculpatory
confession. The "interlocking confessions," combined with
Thomas' declaration against penal interest and the physical evi-
dence present at the scene of the crime bestowed upon Thomas'
confession sufficient "indicia of reliability" to satisfy the second
prong of the test enunciated in Roberts.7 This indicia of reliability
combined with the showing of unavailability dictated that declar-
ant's confession should have been admitted as evidence of the pe-
titioner's guilt despite the absence of Thomas' cross-
examination. 8
C. Harmless Error
It has been demonstrated that the motive behind Thomas' in-
culpatory confession was irrelevant due to the pre-existing incrim-
inating confession of the petitioner.7 9 Since Lee had already con-
fessed to essentially the same crimes to which she was ultimately
inculpated by Thomas, admission of his statement, even in viola-
tion of her sixth amendment rights, resulted in nothing more
than a harmless error.80 In considering whether the admission of
Thomas' statement resulted in a harmless error, the Court should
have determined whether the evidence against Lee would have
been "significantly less persuasive" absent Thomas' confession.81
76 ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 8.2 (Smith-Hurd 1979 & Supp. 1986).
" See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (analysis of indicia of reliability portion
of Roberts test).
"' Lee, 106 S. Ct. 2071 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The indicia of reliability included: the
confession of Thomas which was adverse to his penal interest, the corroboration supplied
by Lee's confession, the corroboration supplied by the physical evidence present at the
scene of the crime, and the voluntary nature of Thomas' confession. Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
" See supra notes 18, 21 and 70-72 and accompanying text (analysis of corroboration
supplied by the confessions of both codefendants).
" See Lung, supra note 70, at 315-17 (brief discussion of "harmless error" rule); Note,
supra note 45, at 1318-21 (same). Cf. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953)
(criminal defendant is entitled to a "fair trial not a perfect one").
I' See Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432 (1972). See also Olson v. Green, 668 F.2d
421, 430 (8th Cir.) (accomplice's statement against penal interest ruled not to contain "in-
dicia of reliability" but admissible under the harmless error rule), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
1009 (1982). In determining whether a harmless error is present, the Court must deter-
mine the "probable impact" on the trier of fact when the evidence in question was admit-
ted. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969).
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CONCLUSION
Over the years, the Court has successfully balanced a criminal
defendant's constitutional right of confrontation against the ad-
missibility of reliable hearsay evidence. The Lee majority, by con-
centrating on the theoretical niceties of the confrontation clause,
and failing to consider the practical realities of the evidence
presented, has effectively struck a fatal blow against the long list
of hearsay exceptions which have painstakingly developed since
the Framers took pen in hand. Under the proper circumstances, a
declaration against penal interest can be as reliable, if not more
so, than a dying declaration, or former testimony. Reliability of
evidence is the ultimate test of admissibility, not limiting catego-
ries, since easy labels do not always supply ready answers. When
all the evidence is weighed, the admissibility of Thomas' confes-
sion should be judged, solely by its reliability. The evidence
presented during the trial showed that Thomas' confession, de-
spite being a declaration against penal interest, was reliable and
trustworthy, and therefore should have been admissible without
transgression of the confrontation clause.
John T. Gallagher
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